Who wants what? : redistribution preferences in comparative perspective
Enregistré dans:
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| Autres auteurs: | |
| Support: | E-Book |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Publié: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press.
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| Collection: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Online)
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| Sujets: | |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Résumé: | Why do some people support redistributive policies such as a generous welfare state, social policy or protections for the poor, and others do not? The (often implicit) model behind much of comparative politics and political economy starts with redistribution preferences. These affect how individuals behave politically and their behavior in turn affects the strategies of political parties and the policies of governments. This book challenges some influential interpretations of the political consequences of inequality. Rueda and Stegmueller provide a novel explanation of how the demand for redistribution is the result of expected future income, the negative externalities of inequality, and the relationship between altruism and population heterogeneity. This innovative and timely volume will be of great interest to readers interested in the political causes and consequences of inequality |
| Accès en ligne: | Accès à l'E-book Accès sur la plateforme ISTEX (corpus CUP) |
| Lien: | Collection principale:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Online) |
Table des matières:
- Cover; Half-title; Series information; Title page; Copyright information; Contents; Figures; Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Why Redistribution Preferences?; 1.2 Who Wants What?; 1.3 Analytical Strategies; 1.4 Data sources and Coverage; 1.5 Measuring Redistribution Preferences; 1.6 Measuring Income; 1.7 Where to Go from Here; Part I Material Self-Interest: Redistribution and Insurance; 2 Income, Income Expectations, Redistribution, and Insurance; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Argument; 2.2.1 Material Self-Interest: Related and Competing Arguments; 2.2.2 Our Argument
- 2.3 Calculating Expected Income2.3.1 Expected Income in Western Europe; 2.3.2 Expected Income in Germany and Great Britain; 3 Income Expectations as Determinants of Redistribution; 3.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 3.1.1 Variable Definitions; 3.1.2 Statistical Specification; 3.1.3 Results; 3.1.4 Robustness Tests; 3.2 Panel Evidence I: Germany; 3.2.1 Variable Definitions; 3.2.2 Statistical Specification; 3.2.3 Results; 3.2.4 Robustness Tests; 3.3 Panel Evidence II: United Kingdom; 3.3.1 Variable Definitions; 3.3.2 Statistical Specification; 3.3.3 Results; 3.3.4 Robustness Checks
- Part II Beyond Income: Externalities of Inequality4 Externalities and Redistribution; 4.1 The Argument; 4.1.1 Material Self-Interest; 4.1.2 Externality-Related Motivations; 4.1.3 Macroinequality and Fear of Crime; 4.2 Preliminary Analysis; 4.2.1 Regional Variation in Inequality and Fear of Crime; 5 Analysis of Externalities; 5.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 5.1.1 Variable Definitions; 5.1.2 Statistical Models; 5.1.3 Results: Inequality; 5.1.4 Results: Fear of Crime; 5.1.5 A Placebo Test; 5.1.6 Robustness Checks; 5.2 Panel Evidence: United Kingdom; 5.2.1 Variable Definitions
- 5.2.2 Statistical Models5.2.3 Results; 5.2.4 Robustness Checks; Part III Beyond income: Population heterogeneity; 6 Heterogeneity and Redistribution; 6.1 The Argument; 6.1.1 Material Self-Interest; 6.1.2 Altruism; 6.1.3 Identity and In-Group Altruism; 6.1.4 Altruism: Short Time-Horizon and High Stakes for the Poor; 6.2 Preliminary Analysis; 6.2.1 Heterogeneity and Redistribution; 6.2.2 Regional Heterogeneity in Western Europe and the United States; 7 Analysis of Heterogeneity; 7.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 7.1.1 Variable Definitions; 7.1.2 Statistical Specifications; 7.1.3 Results
- 7.1.4 Robustness Tests7.1.5 Additional Microlevel Implication: Immigration Attitudes; 7.2 Repeated Cross-Sectional Evidence: United States; 7.2.1 Variable Definitions; 7.2.2 Statistical Specifications; 7.2.3 Results; 7.2.4 Robustness Checks; 7.2.5 The 1996 PRWORA Reform; 7.2.6 Additional Microlevel Implications: Racial Attitudes; 7.2.7 The Crucial Role of Race; Part IV From preferences to voting; 8 The Political Consequences of Redistribution Demands; 8.1 Income, Inequality, Heterogeneity, and Redistribution Preferences; 8.2 Redistribution Preferences and Political Behavior