Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Acemoglu, Daron, 1967-
Autres auteurs: Robinson, James A., 1960-
Support: Livre
Langue: Anglais
Publié: New York (N.Y.) : Cambridge University press, cop. 2006.
Sujets:
Autres localisations: Voir dans le Sudoc
Résumé: Editor's description : "This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization."
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041 0 |a eng 
082 |a 321.8 
082 |a 321.9 
082 |a 330.09 
100 1 |a Acemoglu, Daron,  |d 1967- 
245 1 0 |a Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy   |c Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. 
260 |a New York (N.Y.) :  |b Cambridge University press,  |c cop. 2006. 
300 |a 1 vol. (XV-416 p.) :  |b ill. en noir, couv. ill. en coul. ;  |c 24 cm. 
500 |a Autre(s) tirage(s) : 2007, 2009, 2012 
504 |a Bibliogr. p. 381-399. Index 
505 0 |a Part I. Questions and Answers -- Section 1. Paths of Political Development: -- Section 2. Our Argument -- Section 3. What Do We Know About Democracy? -- Part II. Modelling Politics -- Section 4. Democratic Politics -- Section 5. Nondemocratic Politics -- Part III. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy -- Section 6. Democratization -- Section 7. Coups and Consolidation -- Part IV. Putting the Models to Work -- Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class -- Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy -- Part V. Conclusion and The Future of Democracy -- Section 10. Conclusion and the Future of Democracy -- Part VI. Appendix -- Section 11. Appendix to Section 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy 
520 |a Editor's description : "This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization." 
650 |a Démocratie  |x Aspect économique 
650 |a Démocratisation 
650 |a Despotisme 
650 |a Science politique  |x Études comparatives 
700 1 |a Robinson, James A.,  |d 1960-  |4 aut 
993 |a Livre 
994 |a EX 
995 |a 103837906 
997 |0 409560